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I didn’t check dates, but in my memory, I started frequenting the Colloquium roughly when I 
started visiting New York regularly – in other words, a long time ago. So long ago that for a 
short time I saw others join Tom and Ronnie in conducting the colloquium, some officially, and 
some by the sheer weight of their presence. I am thinking especially of Donald Davidson, a 
regular attendee during his visit at NYU, and later of Barry Stroud, who had a similar position. 
The Colloquium changed in many ways over the years. After it was moved to its current 
location it lost the excitement of overcrowded class rooms and participants chasing chairs all 
over the building to bring into them, and after no more chairs could be squeezed in, just piling 
up, on top of one another on window sills, and in the open doorway to the room, spilling into 
the corridor outside. Like all human institutions, perhaps especially after they become hallowed, 
the Colloquium was not everyone’s cup of tea. But apart from delighting and enlightening 
generations of students, and passing visitors, it also accumulated a bunch of loyal followers for 
whom it has become an important part of their philosophical diet.  
What made the Colloquium special, what gave it the character it preserves through the various 
changes, was the incisiveness and insight of the criticism by Tom and Ronnie in their very 
different ways. True, the papers presented had to be of some quality to benefit, and to benefit 
the audience, by being criticized in these ways. Poor papers fell flat and left Tom and Ronnie 
with nothing of interest to say. But what I and others learnt most was not what the papers 
themselves brought to it, but how their strengths and weaknesses were illuminated by the two 
custodians of the Colloquium. 
In offering the reflections that follow I availed myself of the liberty given by the organizers to 
deviate from the range of topics preferred for the Colloquium itself. But I trust that my 
remarks remain firmly within the concerns central to the thought of both Dworkin and Nagel, 
sharing their belief in the irreducibility of the normative, and struggling, as they did, to strive to 
understand how the normative aspects of reality, which are not secondary or derivative, relate 
to the non-normative aspects of reality. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3024030 
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Introduction 
Among the many, often conflicting, images and ideas about morality that nourish our thinking, 
permeating it even when they do not lead to specific conclusions, are thoughts about morality 
as dependent on human nature, and on the social conditions of human existence, and as meant 
for humans, having no existence without them, and as created, or invented, by humans, 
individually or collectively. These and other thoughts tend to make us think of morality as 
changeable and changing.1 But no less pervasive are thoughts that morality is independent of us, 
facing us with demands whether we want them or not, thoughts that we are subject to morality 
willy nilly, that sometimes, perhaps often, we are called upon to sacrifice the most cherished 
and desired things in our life in a moral cause. These and related ideas and images tend to make 
us see morality as unchanging, existing independently of us, so that we have to struggle to find 
out what it demands of us, and to struggle, sometimes against our nature, to comply with its 
demands, or to live up to its standards. 
Ideas belonging to these two poles, or many versions of them, share important features. They 
all allow for a cognitivist view of morality, namely that there are morally correct and morally 
incorrect views. Even when they appear to conflict it is not obvious that they do, and 
theoretical attempts to reconcile them abound, the best known being Kant’s idea of the moral 
law being both made by the self-legislation of rational agents, and binding on them in virtue of 
their rational nature, which leaves no room for choice as to which moral laws to make. This 
paper is another attempt to explore the two apparently conflicting strands in reflections about 
morality, prevalent in our culture, except that I will generalize and consider normative 
principles generally, taking moral principles to be among them. I will also simplify and discuss 
most of the time principles of duty only. The question will be can principles of duty change? The 
focus on them is not because they are more important or significant than other principles. I do 
not believe that they are. It is merely a simplifying device. The assumption is that if they can 
change so can other normative principles, and that by exploring the possibility of change and 
                                             
1  My interest is in the possibility of basic normative change, namely one which is not merely 
due to a change in non-normative facts yielding a change in the application of 
(independently existing) normative considerations. Much of the time I discuss the 
possibility of normative change generally, as a way of bringing out the problems involved 
with the possibility of basic change. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3024030 
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contingency in normative principles we will improve our understanding of the nature of 
normativity. 
The difficulties in defending the possibility of change are considerable. That possibility runs 
contra to a common understanding of the nature of reality – roughly speaking affirmed by 
Hume, in the wake of the rise of modern physics, and the Gallilean revolution. That 
understanding has been challenged by Kant and others, the most interesting under Kantian 
influence. Needless to say, this is not the occasion for an extensive discussion of these issues. 
But their presence in the background dictates the structure of the paper. Its first part argues 
for the possibility of change by removing an objection to it, an objection that appears to be a 
compelling consequence of the nature of normativity. The second part of the paper surveys and 
comments on difficulties of accommodating the possibility of change of normative principles 
with various common views about the nature of reality. 
Part One: Removing an Objection to the Possibility of Change 
1. The Arbitrariness difficulty, and its background 
A person’s moral duties, rights and other normative conditions may change from time to time. 
Often, we invoke a general proposition in order to explain the changes. It says that one has that 
duty only under certain conditions and they existed at one point in time, but no longer exist at 
a later point, and so on. But is it possible for the explaining propositions to be true under some 
conditions and not others? Most societies hold that one has a moral duty to bury one’s dead 
kin. Let us assume that they are right and we have such a duty. Sophocles’ Antigone died for 
keeping that duty. That proposition: one has a duty to bury one’s dead kin, both explains and 
justifies her actions. But what if one’s kin died of Ebola? During the recent outbreak, many 
people knowingly put their lives at risk, and fought nurses and police, to bury their loved ones. 
Did they have this duty in these, changed, circumstances? Possibly not; in which case the 
explanation invoked over many generations to justify the duty did not apply to them, and 
perhaps does not apply anymore at all. How are we to understand that change? One common 
reaction is to say that the principle invoked was incompletely stated, the case of deadly 
infection from contact with the dead was omitted because it is rare, and there is no need to 
mention it in most cases. Another reaction is to suggest that the duty to bury may be 
overridden by conflicting principles, as is the case in the Ebola example. In other words, one 
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way or another these reactions suggest that there is always an unchanging explanation, and 
appearances to the contrary are due to incomplete statements of the explanation. People’s 
normative conditions change, but the moral principles that explain their conditions cannot 
change. 
Notice that confidence in that conclusion is often great, and is independent of actually having 
the complete explanation needed to establish the case. We are not deterred by ignorance of a 
complete explanation that is at least potentially unchanging. We feel confident that there is one 
even though we do not know what it is. Therefore, the way that we treat examples does not 
establish that moral principles cannot change. Rather it relies on that view. But why accept it in 
the first place?  
I will continue to discuss the conclusion informally, but some clarification is required to avoid 
confusion: when referring to normative propositions I ignore propositions about people’s actual 
or hypothetical or possible beliefs about the normative situation of this or that. I will also 
ignore propositions about whether or not, or to what degree people conform to, or enjoy etc. 
their normative conditions. Rather, the propositions to be discussed here are general 
propositions that express the application, actual or conditional, of some normative property, 
such as having a duty, or its implications. Typically, these are propositions saying that x has a 
duty, or a right etc. or has had it or will have it when C obtains, or they are propositions that 
entail some conditions for the application of a normative property. The conditions, C, can be 
non-normative or normative or a mix. Normally we say that such propositions apply when the 
conditions are met. My interest is in whether propositions that express principles are true, 
always or a-temporally, or not. We do not normally refer to all general propositions of this 
character as principles. I will use ‘normative principles’ informally to refer to true general 
normative propositions that have the power to explain or that non-trivially contribute to the 
explanation of the phenomena they are about. So, for example, that people should honour and 
care for their parents, truly states both how people should behave towards some people and 
that that those people are one’s parents is part of the explanation why one should so behave. 
Or, schematically, that all humans have a duty to A is a principle if they have that duty because 
they are human. By way of contrast, that all males have a duty to A is not a principle, if they 
have the duty because they are human. The distinction is vague, but neither for our purpose 
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nor for any other I know of, does the precise delineation of principles matter. When in doubt 
count it as a principle.  
Note that principles are not rules or norms or standards, etc. These are made by people, 
individually or collectively. They may affect the duties, rights, privileges etc. that we have, and 
there are principles that state when they do. Binding rules, like binding promises, come and go, 
and they give rise to rights and duties. There are principles that determine when a rule or 
standard or promise etc. Is binding. 
The No change thesis says that normative principles cannot change. The challenge of 
arbitrariness may be the most powerful argument for the no change thesis. Consider the 
possibility that if people or their circumstances change, governments have duties that they do 
not have absent that change. Assume that governments do not have the right, let alone a duty, 
to place people in administrative detention; and that someone claims 
C: if humans become subject to condition X governments have a duty to place 
those who have the condition in administrative detention. 
We may well reserve judgement, because, we would say, it all depends on what that condition 
is. Compare the following  
(1) If humans become subject to deadly diseases that manifest themselves only after long periods 
of undetectable incubation governments have a duty to place those who had contact with 
people who have the disease in administrative detention. 
(2) If all people start losing the sight of their left eye during their 50th year governments have a duty 
to detain people on the day before their 50th birthday. 
We are more likely to believe that (1) is correct than that (2) is. Why? Because we can imagine 
a normative principle that validates (1), e.g.  
    (3) Governments have a duty to prevent the spread of deadly diseases,  
but we find it hard to think of a normative principle that would establish that (2) is true. In the 
absence of a normative principle to explain and justify why the change makes a normative 
difference we reject the thought that it does. It renders the putative normative change resulting 
from the non-normative one arbitrary. And we do not believe that normative principles can be 
arbitrary.  
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But does the absence of a normative principle explaining it render the normative change stated 
in (2) arbitrary? Saying that it is arbitrary assumes that there ought to be an explanation of a 
certain kind and it does not exist. Without that assumption, the change is merely unexplained, 
not arbitrary. Why assume that there ought to be an explanation? And why assume, as I do, 
that there ought to be a normative explanation (i.e. an explanation where a semantically 
irreducible normative proposition is among the explanans)?  
That second point is crucial, for obviously there can be other explanations. That the loss of 
sight in the left eye is due to a new mutation that has spread quickly and affects all humans may 
explain it, but it is not the kind of explanation that can explain the duty it is supposed to have 
generated. That if the government interns people before their 50th birthday there will be fewer 
people with limited eyesight at large is a consequence of observing the duty that (2) attributes 
to governments, but it can hardly be said to explain that duty. By way of contrast, that if 
governments observe the duty claimed in (1) the spread of deadly diseases will be halted, is a 
consequence of observing that duty, and it does seem to explain why governments have the 
duty. It explains that by connecting the duty asserted in (1) with the one asserted in (3), 
subsuming (1) under (3), and thus explaining (1) in the required way, it establishes that (1) 
provides a way of fulfilling the duty stated in (3).2  
The example generalises, and suggests that the availability of normative explanations is in the 
nature of the normative. Furthermore, their availability is a feature of the normative for reasons 
that do not concern “our” problem of normative change. It is possible to explain the existence 
of any normative condition because it is in the nature of the normative that (a) it is intelligible 
to those to whom it applies (if it is a duty, it is intelligible to those subject to it, etc.), and (b) 
that intelligibility is communicable, in that normative conditions can be explained. Why?  
2. The Normative Intelligibility thesis 
The first condition – Intelligibility – first, beginning with what it is not: It should not be confused 
with intuitionism, at least not if intuiting that p is a transparent mental state (i.e. one of whose 
presence one cannot fail to be aware) whose presence makes it certain that p (or some variant 
of this condition). I will suggest that there is “a feel” as part of finding something intelligible, but 
                                             
2  I take a principle B to be subsumed under another principle A if either A entails B or 
following B makes it likely that A will be followed or that its goal will be realized. 
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the same experience is part of mistakenly thinking that one finds it intelligible. Nor is the 
intelligibility of duty-related principles, or the intelligibility of having the duties that they relate 
to, a feature of or a condition of believing that the principles are true or correct, or believing in 
the existence of the duties. One may believe that one has a certain duty because one was so 
advised by a reliable expert, or because that is the common view and, in the circumstances, it is 
unlikely that the common view is mistaken, and yet find it unintelligible that one has that duty.  
Perhaps we must, if we believe that we have a duty, believe that it can be intelligible to us even 
though it is not currently intelligible to us?3 Not quite: there can be, and there are, views that 
take at least some domains of normative considerations, often a religious domain, to be beyond 
human understanding. We can know our duties because we were commanded what to do, but 
it is not for humans to comprehend the point of those commands, etc. Of course, people who 
have such beliefs are mistaken and by implication they have mistaken views of the nature of 
normativity. So, perhaps we could say of those who have a correct view of the nature of 
normativity that if they believe that they have a duty they believe that it can be intelligible to 
them, even if it is not currently intelligible. This may be right, but does it apply to (presumably) 
the vast majority of people who have no explicit view about the nature of normativity?  
What the intelligibility thesis says is that the existence of a duty can be intelligible to those 
subject to it. We may assume that generally (but not that universally) those who entertain 
normative thoughts implicitly believe that. That is why we assumed that they are more likely to 
believe the duty stated in (1) than in (2) above – it is more likely to be intelligible, and they 
believe, at least implicitly, that normative conditions are intelligible. 
Does it mean that false beliefs about duties are not intelligible to those who would have the 
duty if the beliefs were true? The thesis is about the intelligibility of the fact that we are subject 
to duties, and to other normative conditions. If it is right that generally people would not 
believe in a duty-related principle whose duties are not taken to be intelligible to those subject 
to them, when they do believe in such principles they implicitly believe that the duties, if indeed 
they exist, are intelligible to their subjects. Those believing in the principles may believe (rightly 
or wrongly) that they themselves are subject to them. In that case they generally also implicitly 
                                             
3  Remember that the intelligibility thesis claims only that duties, and other normative 
conditions, are intelligible to those subject to them.  
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believe that the duties, if they apply to them, are intelligible to them (meaning, as we saw, that 
they can be intelligible to them). As they also believe that the duties apply to them they believe 
that they are intelligible. If the duties do not exist that belief is mistaken, though their implied 
belief that if they exist they are intelligible is correct. 
But what is intelligibility and why assume that the normative domain is intelligible? First, I have 
to disambiguate two ways in which I have been using the term without drawing attention to the 
ambiguity in its use. In some contexts ‘intelligibility’ refers to (1) a property of a duty or 
principle. In others, it is (2) a relation between the person subject to the duty or principle and 
the duty to which he is subject. A duty is intelligible (1) when it can be intelligible (2) to the 
people to whom it applies. Hence, my duty may be intelligible to me, but I may find it 
unintelligible while knowing that it is intelligible, meaning that it may become intelligible to me. 
This is a natural way of referring to matters, though not when they are referred to in one and 
the same statement. Put it in other words: I may understand why I am subject to my duty, but I 
may also not understand that, while knowing that I can come to understand it (is intelligibility 
understanding? See below). So, a duty is intelligible to a person when it is intelligible to that 
person, or when it can become intelligible to him or her. 
 
The normative domain is one in which we react, actively, using our rational powers, to 
situations in light of a (correct or mistaken) understanding of the proper way to react to them 
in thought, action or emotion. These reactions, let me underline, are not knee jerks, nor cases 
of being propelled (by desire, fear, anger etc.), having lost one’s self-control. They are our 
active responses, ones that we take to be appropriate, and that means that we see their point 
or believe that they have a point. We react as we do because we think that that is the way to 
react – we understand (or think we do, for we may be prey to self-deception, rationalisations, 
etc.) that these are the ways to react. That means that normative considerations (the 
considerations we thus react to) are intelligible to us. We see their point, or believe that they 
have a point, and except in cases in which we succumb to self-hate, self-debasement, and other 
such psychological motives, we approve of how we react, we stand by it, as it were, or when 
convinced that we were mistaken, we regret our reactions.  
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Talk of intelligibility and of seeing the point of a duty may sound mysterious. Does it mean 
more than knowing or believing that one has a duty? I think that it does. Intelligibility includes a 
measure of understanding, which consists to a large degree in ability to place the knowledge or 
belief in context, seeing its place in relation to much else, and an ability to extrapolate, to 
derive more beliefs from it (all being a matter of degree). But intelligibility also comes with a 
certain feeling that accompanies or colours the belief or knowledge that there is a duty (or 
right or normative reason, etc.). It is indicated by the common choices of terminology: a feeling 
that acting as one has a duty to do is a fitting act in the circumstances, a fitting or appropriate 
response to the situation, and other similar expressions. We can understand something without 
realising that we do, while continuing to feel puzzled by it. This may be due, e.g., to a 
misunderstanding of what understanding consists in, wishing for some miraculous answer which 
does not make sense. When a principle or the having of a duty is intelligible to us our 
understanding is coloured by that feeling that things are fitting, or something like that. When 
we explain why we have a duty it is this feeling that we explain by justifying it. We explain why 
we are justified to feel that acting as we have a duty to is fitting, and or appropriate, and why 
our belief has that colour. But the feeling is there independently of our ability to explain it. 
Perhaps it is easiest to perceive it when our conviction is strong even though we find it difficult 
to explain. Many people firmly believe that incest is wrong, but are less sure about why. The 
feeling of fittingness or appropriateness accompanying the belief is there to see, often rising to 
indignation when their belief is challenged, or to discomfort when they sense a doubt in it. That 
kind of colour or feeling accompanies any securely held normative beliefs (whether right or 
mistaken), though it is possible to know that one has a duty without that feeling, without seeing 
its point.4   
3. The Explainability thesis 
This does not entail that we can communicate, that is explain, why our reactions make sense. 
We may see the point of having a duty without being able to explain it. For example, some 
versions of intuitionism have it that while the normative is intelligible it cannot always be 
explained. It can only be intuited. We “see” why there is a duty in such circumstances, and the 
intuition can be shared, but those who do not have it cannot be rationally convinced that this is 
                                             
4  I am not suggesting that it is exclusive to normative beliefs. 
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so by providing them with an explanation of why the duty is there. If an explanation does not 
compel (on pain of irrationality) acceptance, it is no explanation – they contend. 
I will not try to argue that the normative can always be explained. But I want to offer some 
observations that may make it more plausible that it can be, by pointing out some of the things 
that even good explanations cannot, or at any rate need not, accomplish. 
For example, the thesis that the normative can be explained is not at odds with intuitionism. 
Explanations convince people qua explanations only if they understand them and realise that 
they do. That understanding (and the point is general, not being confined to explanations of the 
normative) presupposes both that the people to whom the explanation is addressed have 
certain capacities, rational, perceptual, emotional, and that they have certain experiences. Little 
can be explained to the very young. And that is not because of the limits on what can be 
explained, but the limits of their abilities and experiences required to understand the 
explanation. Given the required capacities and experiences, and the strength of mind to 
question beliefs that have been instilled in one by those one has been brought up to respect, a 
good explanation, once it is understood, convinces. It convinces because one sees the point. It 
makes one see why there is a duty in such circumstances, and so on. In other words, 
explanations, to work, require the capacity to see how they explain, to realise that they explain, 
and that may be the power to intuit, or at least a power to intuit. 
Second, the availability of explanations does not guarantee agreement, not even if everyone is 
given an explanation. Explanations can be based on false assumptions, and there can be disputes 
regarding which explanations are good ones. In any case, many mistaken beliefs about duties 
etc. may be, up to a point, intelligible. We cannot expect that if there are explanations they will, 
if offered, eliminate disagreement, not even in the long run. 
 Perhaps this indicates that the practical importance of explanations is not as great as is 
sometimes supposed. All the same the theoretical question whether there are always 
explanations for the existence of normative conditions, such as that someone has some duty, is 
significant. 
Perhaps we can make progress by comparing the explainability thesis with a view fast becoming 
very popular, according to which there is a special kind of relationship, the grounding 
relationship, such that every true normative proposition is true in virtue of there being a 
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ground for the condition it expresses or describes. Call this the Grounding Thesis. It may be 
thought to vindicate the explainability of the normative: these explanations, it may be said, 
consist simply in pointing to the ground of the condition explained. If one has a duty then there 
is a ground in virtue of which one has that duty, and that ground explains the duty.  
I remain neutral about the grounding thesis. Even if true it does not establish that explainability 
is true. In part this is because there are likely to be true normative propositions whose truth 
does not depend on a ground. For example, I doubt that there are grounds that can explain 
why propositions of the following forms are true:  
(1) Necessarily, if x is of value then it is possible for there to be some circumstances in which x’s 
value is a reason to protect x’s existence or to bring it about that x. 
(2) Necessarily, if there is a reason to M then it is possible5 to M for that reason. 
More to our point, however, is the fact that the grounding thesis does not establish that the 
grounds are either knowable or explainable. Moreover, one may know that G is the ground of 
some duty D, without understanding why D, and without understanding why or how G is its 
ground. Example: the ground of my duty to M may be my having promised to M. I may know 
that, and still not understand why when I promise I have a duty. Given that knowing the ground 
for a duty does not entail either having an explanation of why the duty exists, nor that one 
understands why it exists, the grounding thesis does not guarantee explainability without the 
support of an additional thesis about the explainability of grounds.  
The two theses have different intellectual sources, though the theses are compatible and may 
turn out to converge. The grounding thesis as commonly presented is based on the thought 
that whatever is normatively binding must be so in virtue of something. That something is, or is 
related to, the essence of the normative condition. This is an objective pull, drawing on the 
constraints or the appeal of metaphysical theorising. It contrasts with the subjective pull 
drawing us to the explainability thesis, subjective because it draws on the way normative 
considerations function in the life of those capable of appreciating them. This is the kind of 
consideration that argued for the intelligibility thesis: The normative is the domain of 
considerations by which we guide ourselves, intentionally, because we see the point of those 
                                             
5  Meaning: It is possible for there to be circumstances such that when they obtain it is 
possible to M for that reason. 
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considerations, because we understand, or think we do or can do, their point. The case for the 
explainability thesis derives from the same source.  
 The explanations the thesis is about are, needless to say, good explanations. Explanations are 
good if the person to whom they are addressed can come to understand what they explain by 
considering the explanation and being minded to follow it if it is sound. In other words, 
explanations are good explanations if they succeed with a qualified and willing addressee. 
Various arguments converge to show that what we can understand can be understood by 
others, provided they have the required capacities and experiences. Given that explanation 
consists in bringing the other to understand, it is plausible to think that often Mary can explain 
to John why there is a duty (or whatever) by pointing out to him the features that made her 
understand why there is a duty (or whatever). Sometimes the differences between John and 
Mary will undermine that possibility. But then Mary could adjust her explanation to those 
differences, and point to features that would have made her understand had she been in John’s 
position. She can explain this to John, provided he has the required capacities and experiences. 
The pointing that explanations consist in can be purely verbal. But it need not be verbal or 
exclusively verbal.  
These reflections do not, of course, establish that everything normative can be explained. They 
even suggest that not everything can be explained to everyone, because people’s capacities and 
experiences, including their potential to expand, may be limited. But given the intelligibility 
thesis, and the connection between intelligibility and explainability, it is plausible to think that an 
appropriately qualified explainability thesis is true. 
This is not the occasion to try a relatively precise formulation of the thesis. But one aspect of it 
is important to our purpose. Our capacity to understand and communicate is enhanced and 
limited by the concepts, both normative and non-normative, we master. There is no necessary 
sequence by which we acquire them and other concepts that we use to explain and to 
understand them. I mean that we acquire both normative and non-normative concepts at an 
early stage of growing up, and we explain concepts of one category with the help of concepts of 
the other. There is no priority, let alone independence, of one of those categories relative to 
the other. 
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4. Does Explainability require subsumption? 
The arbitrariness argument against change is: 
(1) The coming into being of a new normative principle constitutes an arbitrary change unless it can be 
explained.  
(2) An explanation must include reference to a principle that is already in force, which, together with 
additional factors, explains the new principle. 
(3) Such an explanation shows the new principle to be an application of the existing principle to some 
of the circumstances that fall under it. It explains the new principle by subsuming it. 
Subsumptive Explanation is a capacious form of explanation. It includes, of course, explanation 
by generalisation as, for example, explaining why Americans have a duty not to kill by invoking 
the principle that all humans have that duty and Americans are humans. But it also includes 
constitutive explanations, namely explaining why A is valuable by the fact that A, which is a 
constituent part of B, contributes to the value of B, and since B is valuable, all its constituents 
part that contribute to its value are valuable. 
Accepting the first premise I will challenge the others. But before I do that two important 
concessions: 
The first is that there are forms of intuitionism that escape this argument, by allowing that the 
new principle is intelligible but cannot be explained. Its validity is simply intuited. I will not 
consider that possibility. 
Secondly, given that by their nature normative considerations are capable of guiding and 
evaluating conduct, character, etc., and that therefore they are accessible to the people whose 
conduct etc. they can guide and evaluate, it is reasonable to assume that no normative change 
can retrospectively reverse the standing of a person’s actions, emotions, character etc. For 
example, no change of normative principles happening today can make something I did 
yesterday wrong, if it was not wrong when I did it. In retrospect, it can turn out to have been 
an unfortunate thing to do, etc. But it cannot become wrong or dutiful or virtuous if it was not 
so at the time. This is consistent with changes to our understanding of our moral conduct, and 
indeed of moral and other normative principles, changes in their understanding that occur due 
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to the emergence of new normative principles. The new principles may provide new 
explanations of the older principles, relocating them in a deeper context.6 
Back to the argument against basic normative change: Its third premise was that normative 
explanations are subsumptive explanations. But not all of them are. I will mention only one 
other kind of explanation: explanation based on argument by analogy. I treat it as a distinctive 
kind of argument. Possibly it should be treated as a family of related arguments; that makes no 
difference to our purpose. I take analogical arguments to be defeasible (non-monotonic) 
arguments consisting of four types of premises or groups of premises. 
(a) The Target: Some a has a feature F. 
(b) The Similarity: both a and something else, b, have a feature G. 
(c) The Relevance: a and b having G is relevant to b’s having F: Roughly, given the background, that 
they both have G makes it likely that if a has F so does b. 
(d) The Closure: There is no reason to think that the relevance is undermined in the instant case. 
The conclusion is then drawn that b has F. 
There are also negative analogies: given that a is F and that while a is G, b is not-G, b is not-F 
either. Their additional premises are inevitably different, but these differences do not affect our 
concerns and I will not discuss them further. 
The key to the success of an argument by analogy is in the relevance premise: does it support 
the conclusion, and does it do so to the degree required given the nature of the conclusion, and 
the circumstances in which we draw it?7 Naturally, there have been various attempts to 
formalise that premise, or at least to make it much more detailed8, and I have no doubt that 
various kinds of analogical arguments can be made precise, and some can be formalised to make 
them suitable for use by deterministic robots. But I doubt that analogical reasoning itself is 
amenable to these kinds of explanations.  
                                             
6  See my “Moral Change and Social Relativism”, CULTURAL PLURALISM AND MORAL 
KNOWLEDGE, eds. E.F. Paul, F.D. Miller, and J Paul (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1994). 
 
7  See my paper ‘Normativity: The Role of Reasoning’ (PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES, 25 
Normativity 2015, ed. Ram Neta) for an elaboration. 
8  For a helpful survey and bibliography see Bartha, Paul, "Analogy and Analogical 
Reasoning", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), url = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/reasoning-analogy/. 
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We are familiar with the fact that people’s knowledge, including their “knowledge how”, 
extends beyond their ability to articulate what they know, let alone to explain it. This ability to 
exceed one’s power to articulate enables people to reason on the basis of deductive arguments. 
Many who rely in their reasoning on deductive arguments do not have explicit knowledge of 
what deduction is, nor what rules of inference they rely on. Probably the vast majority of 
people do not have explicit knowledge of all the rules of inference they rely on, not even all the 
rules of deductive inference in virtue of which their reasoning is valid. The ability to reason well 
does not depend on an ability to articulate, let alone to defend, the (sound) rules of inference 
one relies on. It is sufficient that one relies on them, and that it was not by chance that one did.  
Needless to say, the same is true of analogical arguments. Analogical reasoning may be special in 
that its rules of inference cannot be completely articulated and formalised. That is, it seems to 
me plausible that our knowledge extends beyond our ability to articulate it and that it always 
will. It is a necessary feature of knowledge that those who possess it cannot articulate 
everything that they know. And it may be a necessary feature of knowledge that regarding the 
knowledge possessed by any living organism, it is impossible to articulate it exhaustively.9   
If that is so then it is plausible to assume that there is a form of argument, or a family of 
arguments, regarding which our mastery of them exceeds our ability to articulate in detail, let 
alone with robotic detail, their rules of inference. It is plausible that analogical arguments are of 
that kind, and therefore have special importance as a way of vindicating and explaining 
knowledge claims, including explaining normative knowledge claims. They are arguments our 
mastery of which exceeds the possibility of exhaustively articulating their rules. For it appears 
that, while implicit knowledge, as we can call knowledge that we have but cannot articulate, 
may be relied on whenever we employ other forms of arguments too, analogical arguments are 
particularly suited to reasoning that relies on implicit knowledge, that is reasoning when our 
limited ability to articulate what we know does not enable us to describe in detail the 
inferences we rely on. Even though various special categories of analogical argument may yield 
their secrets and be formalised, there are others that will not. Our ability to employ analogical 
arguments will remain dependent on our implicit knowledge.  
                                             
9  None of this implies that there is anything we know but cannot articulate. The claim is 
merely that we cannot articulate everything we know. 
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It also appears that we rely heavily on analogical arguments in political and ethical thought and 
discussion, and that makes them relevant to our concern here today. For analogical arguments 
do not “work” by subsumption. The explanations they provide do not presuppose a more 
general existing principle. They explain not vertically but horizontally, metaphorically speaking. 
They thus remove the arbitrariness argument against the possibility of basic normative change. 
5. The Possibility of Change (a first go) 
Removing this one objection to basic normative change does not establish that it occurs. Nor is 
it my aim to show that it does. Rather, mine is the more modest ambition: to illustrate that it 
can happen. Those who will be convinced of that will not, I predict, doubt that it has happened 
and will happen again. 
The intelligibility and explainability theses point the way. We are comfortable with the thought 
that there are limits to our normative understanding and that changes in the world can change 
them. But, can changes in the world not only improve our normative understanding, but change 
the normative principles themselves? They can, seems to be the answer. 
Suppose that research into dark matter reveals to us the existence of a condition we were 
unaware of, and indeed were unable to comprehend before the possible existence of dark 
matter could be thought of, and its mysteries cracked open by science. These scientific 
developments came along with mastery of new concepts. One of them, let’s designate it 
‘akatem’, refers to a condition that is dangerous to humans. So now we know that we should 
not expose people to akatem. This is new knowledge, but not a new principle. It is a simple 
application of the principle against endangerment. Morality did not change. Our understanding 
of what conforming to it involves has improved. 
Now imagine that many things change in the dark matter age. Conditions of life, the economy 
and technology change radically in unimaginable ways. Among other things a new form of 
human association, which they call ‘demte’, emerges, radically different from any form of 
friendship or other associations we can imagine today. It defies the distinction between public 
and private interactions, between a one-on-one relationship and group relations, etc. Demte-
related reasons are, naturally, entirely new: when it is desirable to form demtes, when it is 
better to avoid them, how to conduct oneself toward demte associates and how to conduct 
oneself towards others, in matters that affect demte associates, and much else.  
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By hypothesis, demte is (at least potentially) a good form of association among people. And 
again, by hypothesis, the reasons or duties involved in it are no mere application of very general 
principles that we know, or can know. Rather, they constitute independent principles. Their 
emergence constitutes a basic moral change.  
The considerations canvassed so far present no objection to the possibility of moral change of 
this kind. It can meet the conditions of intelligibility and explainability so long as its explanation 
is not by subsumption. And it can meet the condition that there should not be a retroactive 
change in the valence of actions and events, because it only applies to events and actions 
occurring since the arrival of the age of dark matter, for only then did demte associations 
become possible. 
6. Does Explainability require a pre-existing principle? 
This concludes my outline of an argument for the possibility of basic moral change, based on 
rejecting the third premise of the argument from arbitrariness, the premise that took all 
normative explanations to be subsumptive explanations. As indicated above, there is another 
way to challenge the argument from arbitrariness: its second premise too is misguided. It stated 
that a normative explanation of a new principle must include reference to a principle that is 
already in force, or at any rate, one that is in force before that new principle becomes valid. 
To establish that it is mistaken I will explore an objection to the preceding analogy-based 
argument. The objection fails, but it reveals the mistake underlying the second premise. 
The objection is that I was wrong to assume, as the preceding argument does, that analogical 
arguments are an independent kind of argument. In fact they are valid only in cases where both 
sides of the analogy are subsumed under a more general principle. Admittedly in one way 
analogical arguments can be independent of a subsumptive explanation. One can master them 
and reliably follow them without knowing the more general principle on which their validity 
depends. This makes them helpful and important. But au fond, analogical arguments are valid 
only if there are valid subsumptive arguments supporting the same conclusion. Therefore, their 
reach is no greater than that of subsumptive arguments, and therefore they cannot vindicate the 
possibility of basic normative change if subsumptive arguments cannot do so. 
We can examine the objection by applying it to the case of demte. The previous argument 
assumed that demte reasons are real, binding reasons for they are validated by analogy. Perhaps 
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that analogy is cogent only if there is also an argument by subsumption validating demte 
reasons. For example: If demte can be explained by analogy with other phenomena, let’s say by 
partial analogy with C on the one hand complemented by partial analogy with E on the other 
hand, then there is a higher principle of which C, E, and demte are instances, and that vindicates 
the analogies. This higher principle explains demte by subsumption. Therefore, either the 
emergence of demte-related reasons is not a basic normative change, because the more general 
principle is valid prior to demte’s emergence, or demte-related reasons are not valid. Possibly, 
the more general principle was not valid prior to the emergence of demte-related reasons, 
therefore we have no sufficient reason to think that they are valid.  
Why doubt that the more general principle was valid prior to the emergence of demte-related 
reasons? On its face it is already valid, for it applies not only to demte-reasons (which have no 
instances yet) but also to C and to E conditions, and they can already obtain. However, it is 
possible, and the argument does not deny, that the more general principle can be known only 
to people who have concepts that do not yet exist, concepts that will emerge in the dark 
matter age.10 In that case there is as yet no such valid principle; it will be a valid principle only 
once the concepts required to state and to understand it have come into being. That much is 
established by the intelligibility and explainability theses.11 True, we are not subject to demte-
reasons, but we are subject to reasons relating to C and to E, and the putative higher principle 
governs them too. Therefore, if valid now it applies to us now. But if it is not intelligible and 
explainable to us now then it does not apply to us now. Given that we do not know that it is 
intelligible to us now we are not warranted to conclude that it is valid now.  
So far – the objection, or a version of the objection. What are we to make of it? Not much, I 
am afraid. It ignores the fact that while we debate and argue about the validity of various 
analogical arguments, we do not rely on ignorance of a subsumptive explanation to doubt them. 
Rather we use some analogies to undermine others, expressing our acceptance of them as an 
                                             
10  Even if the principle can be stated using concepts already available to us, possibly its 
validity cannot be explained at the moment for its explanation requires concepts that we 
do not and cannot have, concepts that will evolve only in the dark matter age. 
11  I am aware of course of a convention in some areas of philosophy to think of concepts as 
a-temporal, i.e. to deny that they have a history. This may be a useful fiction, or if you 
prefer, a useful stipulative concept, which is a close cousin of concepts, as we know them. 
There is no need to dispute the legitimacy of either concept of concepts. 
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independent form of argument. We may of course be mistaken. But the inescapability of implicit 
knowledge and the intelligibility and explainability theses point to an unavoidable gap between 
what can be explained by subsumption, which relies on knowledge that can be explicit, and 
what can be explained by analogical arguments that rely knowledge that is inescapably implicit. 
The objection has to be rejected. But it draws attention to the possibility that as demte 
relations emerge so does a principle (which at that point is intelligible and explainable), which 
explains demte-reasons by subsumption. Suppose that people of the dark matter era do not 
have an analogical argument to explain demte reasons, but they do have a subsumptive 
explanation of those reasons, though that explanation depends on a new principle, one that 
employs new concepts. Can a new principle that does not refer back to prior principles be 
valid, and thus validate demte reasons? We know that it must be explainable. But possibly its 
explanation can relate only to other new reasons and principles. It will have to be consistent 
with all other valid principles, including those previously valid (though it may conflict with 
them). To that extent its vindication relates to other principles, including those that are already 
valid. But must its vindication relate to all of them? Some people think so. In recent times, for 
example, Dworkin made that claim.12 I know of no reason to believe that that is so. Absent 
such reasons we may be able to endorse a form of radical value pluralism, namely one that 
allows for the possibility of groups of valid normative principles that are intelligible and 
explainable and relatively independent of (some) other groups of principles. If that is right then 
the second premise may also have to be rejected. 
Admittedly, even given radical value pluralism, the likelihood that there will be no explanation 
of the supposed new principle explaining demte-reasons that refers to existing principles or 
considerations is small. It is likely that it will enjoy supportive analogies with existing normative 
conditions. What is unlikely may still be possible. 
7. Can the Possibility of Change be explained? 
Radical normative change is possible. My illustration of its possibility derives from a specific, 
though very common and extremely important, social phenomenon that I will call ‘normative 
                                             
12  R.M. Dworkin, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (Harvard U.P., 2011). In “A Hedgehog’s 
Unity of Value” THE LEGACY OF RONALD DWORKIN, eds. W. Waluchaow & S. 
Sciaraffa (Oxford: O. U.P. 2016) I explained how he failed to make good that claim. 
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social forms’. Some social actions, relationships or conditions cannot exist without their 
participants having appropriate concepts to mark them. That is, people can perform those 
actions (give a gift) or be in those conditions (be married) only if they know what they are 
doing or what condition they are in. They need not have our concepts, but they must have 
some appropriate concepts. For example, “gift” may be a very general concept that does not 
exist and is not available in all cultures. But people may have specific gift-related concepts and 
they give gifts only when they intend to perform an action that instantiates one of them (e.g. a 
thank-you gift, a wedding-gift). Typically, these concepts are normative in that by their nature, 
their instances imply certain reasons towards their occurrence: gifts are appropriate or 
inappropriate, whereas chairs, watches, earthquakes etc. do not essentially imply such reasons. 
Moreover, and that explains their normativity, these concepts are used to refer to, and to 
describe, aspects of cultural values, that is values that are the products of culture, values whose 
existence is made possible by social practices that include actions done in the knowledge of the 
normative significance of those cultural practices (though not necessarily as practices). 
Marriages, friendships, money are examples. Some of these normative institutions (perhaps 
money) have only instrumental value. Others bring with them new values. There was no 
marriage before the social institution of marriage emerged. Without it the value of marriage 
could not be realised. Moreover, it is plausible that one could not know of or understand these 
new values before they came into being, that is before instances of them became possible. Only 
once they are in existence could we think of them and realise either that they can be subsumed 
under a principle that explains them, or that they can be explained through analogies.  
These social forms are both normative, in that their existence generates new reasons for 
conduct for those who engage in them (and for everyone, regarding them and the people who 
engage in them). They are, when valid, intelligible and explainable in the usual way. Normally 
they will be explained either by subsumption or in some other way, e.g. analogy, involving 
reference to already valid principles or other social forms. 
This leads to a puzzle: The case for the possibility of basic normative change depends on the 
possible emergence of new normative principles that are not instances of existing normative 
principles. The intelligibility and explainability theses require that these new principles can be 
explained, and almost invariably they are explained by reference to existing normative 
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principles. However, if the explanation is by analogy, or in any way other than subsumption, the 
argument goes, their emergence constitutes a basic normative change. 
So here is my puzzle: normally, both if they are instances of existing principles and if they are 
not, they are explained by reference to existing normative principles. Given that fundamental 
similarity, how could such a momentous difference, between mere application of existing 
principles and an emergence of basic new principles, rest on the difference between 
subsumption and, say, analogy? 
Is it because there is – in some sense – a greater distance between the explaining principle and 
the explained one, so that the explained one is a greater departure from the existing normative 
principles when it is explained by analogy than when it is explained by subsumption?  This might 
have been a good explanation had it been true, but it is not, as is obvious once we consider a 
case of a basic change, explained by analogy with existing cases, but where there is also a new 
principle emerging that covers both it and the existing cases to which it is analogous. In such a 
case the new and old normative cases, and their attached principles, are both instances of a 
single principle. Hence the distance between them is no greater than can be expected among 
instances of a single principle. But the new case constitutes a basic normative change because 
that principle did not exist before the new case came into being. This kind of situation shows 
that we have no reason to think that explanations by analogy indicate a greater distance than 
explanations by subsumption. 
 Perhaps the difference between subsumption and analogy is that once we can understand two 
principles, A and B, then if B is subsumable under A that will be plain for all to see. It will be, in 
other words, impossible to understand both A and B without realising, when thinking about 
both at the same time, that B is subsumable under A. This condition is not true of analogies. It 
is possible to understand both C and D without realising the relevant similarities between them 
that establish the validity of an analogical argument from one to the other.  
Again, if this were true it would establish an interesting difference between vindication by 
subsumption and vindication by analogy. But it is not true. It is possible for one principle to be 
subsumable under another without this being evident to people who understand both (to a 
degree), and think of both. A topical example is the difficulty that many people have to realize 
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that same sex marriage is an instance of a marriage relationship (even if it is not, say an instance 
of Catholic marriage, namely of a marriage recognized in Catholic doctrine). 
All of this suggests that the difference between vindication by subsumption and by analogy is 
not very significant. Can it underpin the fundamental distinction between basic normative 
change and a novel application of existing principles?  
That is my puzzle. I think that it has something important to tell us. It does not suggest that we 
should abandon or revise any of the arguments or conclusions so far reached. Furthermore, the 
distinction between application to new circumstances of an existing principle, and the 
emergence of a new principle, is unobjectionable. The puzzle shows, however, that some mere 
applications of existing principles resemble, in the relevant respects, the emergence of 
completely new principles. What the puzzle tells us, in other words, is that the distinction 
between mere application of the old and the emergence of the new is not all that important; 
that the newness of some mere applications is as great and as significant as the emergence of a 
completely new principle. And that is something worth learning, for it redirects our attention 
from wondering whether basic change is possible to trying to understand the significance of the 
emergence of principles, whether new or applications of existing ones, which could not have 
been known about or vindicated independently of the social changes that brought them about. 
 
Part Two: Objections and Implications 
The objections to be examined here are not so much objections to the arguments above as 
direct objections to the very possibility of basic normative change. But they are radically 
different from the objection of arbitrariness which was discussed in part one. That objection 
arose out of reflection on the nature of normativity which suggested that intelligibility and 
explainability seemingly imply that change, were it possible, would be arbitrary. The objections 
that follow are, if you like, external in origin. They aim to show that normative change is 
incompatible with fundamental features of reality or with well-established doctrines. I have no 
doubt that some will take this to make them particularly powerful objections. But the opposite 
view is also possible: they are weaker, because the argument can be reversed. One can take the 
possibility of normative change to constitute an objection to the views and doctrines that are 
incompatible with it. This role reversal was not available, at least not in simple form, in Part 
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One. The possibility of role reversal sets a limit to the discussion of this part. It cannot be 
developed into a full-scale examination of the doctrine that lead to the objections. All the paper 
can do is point to incompatibilities, where there are such, and hint at the implications of the 
possibility of normative change. It will have to remain a rough and informal discussion. 
8. Propositions 
To start with an objection to everything I have written here: I took normative principles to be 
true propositions with explanatory potential of the phenomena they are about. That makes it 
plausible to think of a radical change as a change in the truth value of a proposition that is a 
principle if true. But, the objection goes, propositions cannot change their truth value. They are 
a-temporal, or if one thinks of them as temporal that they exist and possess their truth value 
always.  
It is convenient to take moral principles, and any other principles, if not to be propositions at 
any rate to be expressible in propositions, so that necessarily any principle is expressed by one 
proposition (or, to allow forms of vagueness: sets of propositions). The problem can be 
avoided, at least to some degree, if we understand principles to be true propositions that meet 
some additional conditions: I introduced one such condition explicitly: principles have 
explanatory relevance, and another condition implicitly: propositions can be known by those to 
whom they apply. Let’s call putative principles, i.e. ones presented as principles, but which are 
not necessarily principles, valid principles if they are true, explanatorily relevant and knowable 
by their subjects. A proposition can be a valid principle at one time and not at another if it has 
explanatory relevance and is knowable by its subject at one time but not at the other. I assume 
that it is true at both points in time. Its status as a (valid) principle does varies, though its truth 
does not. 
That may be part of the solution. But the considerations put forward above suggest that we 
should go further and deny that the truth value of propositions cannot change. True, some 
think that propositions are a-temporal, or that at any rate it is impossible for them to be true at 
one time and not true at another. That does not reflect the way propositions are commonly 
understood. We do understand the proposition that John was the best tennis player 5 years 
ago but is so no longer, as entailing that (the proposition that) John is the best tennis player is 
no longer true. It is best to avoid verbal disputes. The concept of a proposition whose truth can 
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change, meaning that the truth of some types of propositions can change, as well as the concept 
of a proposition whose truth cannot change have been explored in some detail, and there are 
accounts of the logical properties of each of them. Both have a reasonable claim to represent 
what one says when one asserts something, that is to express the content of what can be 
asserted. After all, that notion, of what one asserts or can assert, is itself subject of the same 
ambiguities and indeterminacies as the notion of a proposition.  
Some would be happy to allow that there is a concept of a proposition that admits that there 
are propositions whose truth value is neither a-temporal, nor unchangeable, that they may have 
a truth-value at one point in time and not have it at another, but they claim that everything 
expressed in such propositions can also be expressed by propositions whose truth value is a-
temporal or just necessarily unchangeable. For example, it can be argued that if there is a 
condition, C, on which the truth of a proposition, P, depends then there is a proposition: P only 
if C that is a-temporal or necessarily of an unchanging truth value. One way of understanding 
the thought that moral principles can change involves denying that all propositions with a 
changeable truth value can be expressed as, or are logically equivalent to, propositions with 
unchangeable truth value. So, if there is a case for thinking that normative principles can change 
there is a case for rejecting the thesis that all propositions can be expressed by a-temporal 
propositions.13  
The temporal character of a proposition may manifest itself in being capable of being true at 
some times, and false or neither true nor false at other times. But the temporality of 
propositions may be due to other facts as well. One would be that the proposition does not 
exist at all times. If so then possibly its existence is time bound, though its truth need not be. 
                                             
13  We have discussed matters using ‘proposition’ in the sense that allows for the possibility 
that some propositions can change their truth value. Normative principles are (among 
other things) truths about the relations that they express. The principle that Gratitude is a 
source of duty is a true proposition about the relations between gratitude and duty. That is, 
it is a principle if and only if and because the relationship holds . This leaves open the 
question what comes first, the principle or the relationship, or which is more fundamental, 
at least when that question is understood epistemically, or as a question about the order of 
understanding. E.g. if the only way to establish that the relationship exists is by reductio of 
the proposition that it does not, then the principle comes epistemically first. Similarly, if the 
only way to explain, to make sense of the existence of the relationship is through 




Propositions that exist may be true (in a sense that is not time-relative) but that is relevant or 
assertible only when they do exist. Alternatively, and less problematically, it is true whenever 
the proposition exists, and when the proposition does not exist it has only conditional 
properties, properties it would have were it to exist. The fact that concepts have a history, and 
that propositions may have concepts among their essential constituents, shows that 
propositions have a temporal dimension, and that the content of temporal propositions cannot 
always be expressed by a-temporal propositions.14 
That normative principles can change does not establish that moral principles can. But if the 
only reason to think that moral principles cannot change would entail that normative principles 
cannot either, then removing that reason would establish that moral principles can change. That 
marks one way in which the question about normative principles helps with answering the 
question about moral principles. 
9. Conditionalization 
Some may be tempted to argue that we can have our cake and eat it: what attracts us to the 
thought that the basic moral principles can change is the supposition that (a) the content of 
moral principles depends on human nature, and (b) human nature is contingent and changeable. 
Hence, it may appear that moral principles are also changeable. But the conclusion is a non-
sequitur. Suppose that one fundamental aspect of human nature is H1 and that the moral 
principles we have, call them P1, are valid only if H1. Suppose that human nature changes, and 
that H1 is replaced by H2, and therefore the moral principles that bind humans are now 
different, call them P2. It does not follow that any proposition changed its truth value, nor that 
basic moral principles changed. Rather what follows is that the basic moral principles were 
(always, or a-temporally): If H1 then P1 and if H2 then P2. What changed is that previously 
when humans had an H1 nature P1 principles applied and now, with their H2 nature, they are 
subject to P2, but that is not due to a change of any principles, only that principles that were 
inapplicable before are applicable now and vice versa.   
                                             
14 If normative principles can change then they are not necessarily true (or, i f validity rather 
than truth makes them principles, not necessarily valid). But they can still be relatively 
necessary, e.g. relative to the laws of nature. 
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The difficulties with this approach can be brought to light by supposing that it is possible for 
humans to develop a sense perception they currently do not have, and indeed one that no 
animal currently has. We do not know what it will be, if it will be, and we cannot know what it 
will be, as it will be a new kind of sense. We lack a concept by which to refer to that sense, and 
can refer to it only by expressions such as ‘the hitherto unknown sense’, which tell us nothing 
about it other than that it is a perceptual sense. It is possible, though we do not know that for 
sure, that its emergence will make us subject to moral principles that we are not subject to at 
the moment. Needless to say, we have no clue, and can have no clue, about their content.  
The question is whether given this situation there is something we are ignorant about, 
something we do not know. It is not something that can be known, but so are many truths. It 
may be impossible now to know whether there was a speck of dust on top of my desk lamp five 
minutes ago. Principles, however, are not like specks of dust. They are essentially knowable. 
They are guides to thought and action, and while they may be unknown, which leads us to look 
for them, it seems odd to think that they can be unknowable. In what way are they guides for 
thoughts and action if unknowable?  
Perhaps, however, principles can be temporarily unknowable. Or, they can be unknowable 
under some conditions provided that they are knowable under others. If we turn our attention 
from the future to the past, we can entertain the thought that there were principles that 
applied to people who lived in very different circumstances and do not apply to us. Such 
principles may be unknowable to us. Perhaps they can be unknowable for the very same 
reasons we are considering: perhaps some people in some remote circumstances possessed 
mental capacities, perceptual or other, that we do not, and we have no idea what they were, or 
what they could have been, as they are not some variant of capacities we are familiar with in 
our or other species, but are entirely unlike anything we know of and in ways that we have no 
idea about. We cannot deny that there were such principles, after all they applied to the people 
who had those capacities. And we have no reason to think that these principles do not exist 
anymore. They do not apply anymore and cannot be known anymore, but that is, given our 
assumptions, possible. 
However, there is, and not only in this case, an asymmetry between past and future. One way 
of thinking about it is to focus on the concepts involved. The arrival of a new sense will bring 
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with it a new concept, related to that sense as the concept of eyesight is to the sense of sight. 
Concepts exists once their instantiation is possible. They may apply to nothing anymore, but 
that does not mean that we ceased to have the concept. If it becomes unknowable this is 
contingent on loss of evidence that would enable us to understand it. However, a possible but 
not yet existing concept is necessarily unknowable, until it comes into existence, if it does. 
10. Normative autonomy 
I am not assuming a unity of explanations. That is, I am not assuming that all the sound 
explanations there are can be can be thought of as parts of one comprehensive explanation, 
using the same methodological principles, of everything that can be explained. I see no 
objection to the view that there are radically and irreducibly different forms of explanation, 
such that there is no explanation of how they all relate to one another, other than by pointing 
to what they are and are not. We can call this the assumption of radical explanatory pluralism. I 
assume that the truth or falsehood of that assumption can be known. 
I am also assuming what I will call the autonomy of the normative. That is, the paper proceeds 
on the assumption that we have ways of referring to normative properties that make possible 
knowledge of the conditions under which they apply, and explanations of why they apply or fail 
to apply and of the normative consequences of their application, which essentially and non-
redundantly employ normative concepts that refer to or apply to normative properties and are 
not reducible to any non-normative propositions or explanations.15  
The autonomy thesis, if correct, both falls short of and reaches beyond what may be called 
epistemic autonomy.  It falls short of it because it leaves open the possibility of knowledge of 
the conditions for the instantiation of normative properties based on non-normative evidence.  
It even allows for knowledge of normative propositions by beings who are incapable of 
understanding some or all normative properties, except possibly in partial and limited ways. 
Such people may acquire normative knowledge by imitation – possibly the way most young 
humans acquire some normative knowledge well before they reach any understanding, and the 
                                             
15  Normative autonomy is consistent with some forms of so-called ontological reduction of 
normative properties. I will not consider such possibilities in this paper. Furthermore, the 
“normative concepts” I refer to should not be identified with so called thick concepts or 
terms, a heterogeneous category, only some of which refer to normative properties. 
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way some people with depleted mental capacities retain moral knowledge even after losing the 
ability to understand it.  
The autonomy thesis reaches beyond epistemic concerns. It is about explanations of the 
normative presupposing normative properties and deploying normative concepts expressing 
them. In this respect, some would regard it as having ontological implications. But here 
objections are possible. Why assume that explanations of the normative relate to normative 
properties? Take a familiar example: 
- [Conclusion] John has a strong reason to jump out of the window! 
- Why? 
- [Premise 1] Because he will die by fire, if he does not. 
This appears to be a good explanation. The autonomy thesis implies that it is incompletely 
stated; that anyone who takes it to be adequate implicitly includes in it an unstated reference to 
a normative property, unstated because it is obvious and needs no explicit mention. Perhaps 
something like: 
- [Premise 2] It would be better for him to stay alive.  
However, the objection goes, Premise 2 is not really an invocation of a normative property. It is 
tantamount to affirming that the explanation is complete, that the specified facts are indeed a 
reason for the indicated reaction, etc. In other words, some version of a buck-passing (or, 
perhaps, of an appropriate attitude) account of value would be invoked here. So, perhaps 
Premise 2 can be rephrased as something like – 
- [Premise 2’] There are no other facts bearing on what he should do. 
A familiar reply is that the fact that an action has some value properties does not only indicate 
that certain reasons follow, it explains why they follow. Buck-passers are inclined to say that 
“This action is good”16 is too thin a remark to have any explanatory power. It merely states that 
the action has some (non-normative) feature that is a reason to perform it. On this view, not 
only is it always true that if one has reason to perform an action then there is some good in the 
action, it is also true that whenever one has reason to perform an action that is because there 
                                             
16 Where it means “this has some value”, and not all occurrences of “good” do mean that, not 
all are normative. 
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is some good in the action. But the second claim is false to our understanding of such claims. 
The fact that there is a reason to perform some action establishes that there is some value in 
that action, making the first claim true. The question is, however, in virtue of what is there such 
a reason (and therefore, what makes this action good)?17 It may be because the action is good in 
itself (and not merely because there is reason to perform it) or a constituent element in 
something good (e.g. a movement in a beautiful dance) or that it will produce something good. 
In such cases it is plausible to say that saying that the action is good is saying that it has some 
features (say, some consequences) that are reasons to perform it. But not all reasons are of this 
kind: that I promised to do something is a reason to do it, and that is consistent with the fact 
that giving the promise was bad and regrettable, and that the act of keeping it has no other 
merit than being the keeping of that promise. In this kind of case it would be wrong or 
misleading to say that one has a reason to perform the act because it is good. It follows that 
saying that one has a reason to I because I-ing is good is informative in a way that buck-passing 
does not allow: it tells us something about the character of the explanation of the reason we 
have, it has a character that not all fact-producing reasons have. 
However, the most important failure of buck-passing accounts is in dealing with other value 
properties. Suppose the reason for some action, e.g. refusing to answer a question whether 
John was in Knox Street on the first of May, is that answering the question would be disloyal to 
a friend. That entails that there is some good in the action (the refusal). It does so by specifying 
what good that is: the good of loyalty to friends. If buck-passers take this to mean that my 
telling whether John was in Knox Street is bad are missing the gist of the matter, and ignore the 
explanatory power of the value statement. They cannot retreat to saying that they mean that 
answering the question is bad in the special way in which telling about a friend is bad. To say 
that is to give up on being a buck-passer. It admits that there are different values which differ in 
ways other than that they are reasons for action. Worse than that, this way of understanding 
my situation (a) employs irreducible value concepts, namely that of telling and of friendship, and 
(b) still does not get to the value that actually motivates me: loyalty, as not all telling on friends 
constitutes disloyalty, and there are other ways of being disloyal than telling.  
                                             
17  Note that “action” refers to what is sometime called action-type, i.e. generally one can 
perform an action more than once, and others can perform the same action one does.  
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These reflections do not prove the autonomy thesis, but they lend it some support. 
11. Queer properties 
I have been defending normative autonomy in this paper because the paper presented an 
explanation of normative change in terms of changing normative properties in a way that 
implies normative autonomy, or at any rate a way that would encounter additional difficulties if 
there is no normative autonomy. However, the implied realism about the existence of 
normative properties encounters the charge that they are peculiar properties, the charge 
whose current form originates with John Mackie. There are various ways in which the charge 
can be understood and developed, and I will present my own understanding of it. The gist of it 
is that normative properties are not connected to reality because (1) their instances do not 
interact causally with the rest of reality; (2) their existence cannot be explained in the way that 
we explain other aspects of the reality; (3) if they are properties of objects or events it would 
be a mystery how they can move people to act as they are supposed to do; (4) they give the 
impression of real properties because within groups with shared culture there are conventions 
that govern discourse about them, and members of those groups by and large observe those 
conventions, with the result that it appears as if discourse purporting to refer to these 
properties can be true or false, whereas in fact it is merely conforming to the conventions or 
failing to do so. 
Briefly, and admittedly inconclusively, a few comments addressing these points in reverse order. 
(4): As this paper argues for the possibility that normative principles can change, and illustrates 
such changes by appeal to cultural changes, the allegation that if normative properties exist they 
depend on social conventions is not exactly an objection. True, they are not, for the most part, 
the product of conventions18, but – and this is the whole point – they are dependent on social 
practices. Is there any objection to the possibility of properties whose existence and 
instantiation depend on social practices, properties without which we would not have 
institutions and their products such as money, intellectual property, novels, or poetry? (3): As 
an objection this point (it is a mystery how they move people to act) is out of place. It amounts 
to no more than denial of the existence of normative properties. That they provide normative 
                                             
18 Though see: A, Marmor,  SOCIAL CONVENTIONS: FROM LANGUAGE TO LAW 
(Princeton University Press, 2009), Chapter Three, on deep conventions. 
 31 
reasons is the essential feature of normative properties. And normative reasons are essentially 
capable of moving people to action, thought, emotions or imaginings. So, we should take the 
point not as an objection but as a question: normative properties are peculiar and call for 
explanation. The explanation, or explanations, come in many parts. Some explain the relations 
between reasons and actions or beliefs or emotions or imaginings, others explain the specific 
character of each normative property. 
The second part of the peculiar properties objection is, at first blush, not an objection. Why 
should these properties be explained in the same way, using the same patterns of explanations, 
etc., as others? If we assume that all explanations have the same character we are of course in 
trouble. It turns out that non-normative properties are peculiar because they cannot be 
explained in the way that normative properties are explained. So, the objection must be taken 
to be more radical: there are no possible explanations of normative properties. The issues 
raised are too numerous to be even mentioned here. But just to indicate the direction of travel 
let me divide them into two types: disputes regarding specific purported normative properties, 
and disputes about the more general possibility of there being any normative properties. The 
two feed into each other. Think of the explanation of specific properties first: Of course, not all 
purported normative properties exist. Some are illusory. The question is whether any can exist, 
and be intelligible. One possible argument proceeds by (a) criticizing all the explanations of all 
normative properties that have been so far offered, and (b) showing that their failure is not that 
they are incomplete, but that they are in principle no good, and (c) that their failure of principle 
is of the same kind in all cases. That, perhaps with one or two additions, would constitute an 
inductive argument to the conclusion that no explanation of any purported normative property 
can succeed. I detect nothing that gives one hope in the success of such an argument.   
A more common alternative is to argue: (a) True, we know that (in certain contexts) people use 
arguments about some normative properties that carry conviction even though, needless to say, 
not always with their intended audiences. This may be thought to point to a tendency for views 
to converge when those who hold them are well informed. More importantly, a larger degree of 
convergence exists regarding an understanding of what constitutes a good argument. However, 
these contexts are ones where speaker and audience share a common culture and are simply 
relying on unexamined common assumptions and conventions. (b) Beyond such islands bound 
by local conventions there is no sign of agreement or of a tendency to converge on a common 
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understanding of what constitutes good argument. That means, the objection goes, that there 
are no objective standards of judgement regarding the existence or character of normative 
properties, and no possibility of such standards. Hence, they do not exist. 
In assessing this and related arguments it is important to trace the causes of disagreement. For 
example, it seems to me that many of them derive from non-normative disagreements, 
especially from disagreements about matters derived from, or being part of, religious outlooks, 
but which are not themselves normative. Belief in miracles, and the use to which such belief has 
often been put, is an example. Non-normative beliefs that are not necessarily involved with any 
religious outlook are also at the root of some normative disagreements. Racist and 
homophobic views are often nourished by ignorance, entrenched by deep psychological 
disinclination to correct mistaken beliefs about these matters. When this is the source of 
normative disagreements it may be taken to cast doubt about the possibility of non-normative 
properties. More plausibly these sources of persistent disagreements show that the significance 
of disagreements may have been exaggerated.19 There is another common source of 
disagreement of interest here. Many disagreements are sustained by mistaken theoretical views 
about the nature of normative facts. For example, I have long argued that indeterminacy and 
incommensurability are very common within the normative domain. Many people think that 
that is necessarily false. This view inclines people who see reason to believe that their own way 
of life is legitimate to believe that ways of life which are incompatible with theirs are not 
legitimate, because they reject as necessarily false the correct view that both are legitimate. 
One ought, and it is possible, to explore in detail these sources of disagreement, and others like 
them – like them in that their explanation refutes the argument from disagreement by showing 
that its sources are not due to there being no normative properties, and do not cast doubt on 
their existence.20 
                                             
19 I am assuming that the claim that regarding objective matters there is a convergence 
towards agreement at the end of inquiry, either as a mark of objectivity or in any other 
way, has been effectively criticized, mostly as empty, and need not be considered in this 
context. 
20 Arguably, if people, perhaps the people of some society, share fundamental theoretical 
mistakes then we are in Error Theory terrain, for a shared understanding of the basic 
characteristics of normative claims at least partially determines their meaning. Be that as it 
may, the crucial point is that that does not mean that one is free to “invent” a new 
meaning. The correct theoretical understanding is not invented. It is determined by the 
same considerations that determine the theoretical underpinning of any area of common 
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Remembering that various doubts about normative properties ignore the possibility that the 
existence and instantiation of normative properties are the product of social practices, the 
preceding comments soften the force of many arguments against the possibility of such 
properties. But they leave the core doubts (as I understand them) untouched. Doubts about the 
ability to explain normative properties, if they are real non-naturalistic properties, may derive 
from the claim that they are not connected with the rest of reality in a way that would enable 
us to refer to them, to come to know them, or, therefore, to explain them. 
12. The Connectedness of Normative Properties 
At first blush the charge that normative properties are peculiar because they are unlike anything 
about the world that we understand, and that the explanations that enable us to understand the 
world around us, namely scientific explanations, do not apply and cannot be used for explaining 
normative properties, is appealing to contemporaries who came to see the natural sciences as 
the only source of knowledge and understanding. As a matter of fact, few people understand 
the natural sciences beyond a rudimentary level and few people understand aspects of the 
world surrounding them through the natural sciences. Instead people trust (quite sensibly) that 
other people do know science and that the natural sciences explain aspects of reality to the 
satisfaction of those who understand them. On the other hand, all those people whose 
knowledge of the sciences is poor know and understand much of the world around them in 
ways that are independent of the sciences, and that the natural sciences do not explain, and this 
includes their understanding of themselves and other living beings, and of social practices and 
institutions, and the culture and economic opportunities, or lack of them, that those social 
practices and institutions sustain.  
This is not to cast doubt on the importance of the natural sciences, nor to deny that 
psychological and social and economic phenomena benefit greatly from specialist expertise, 
even though it is not widely shared in the population. I am only denying that they are the sole 
sources of knowledge and understanding for human beings. 
                                             
discourse. There are issues here of the possibility of providing a correct account of the 
theoretical underpinning of a range of phenomena when many people hold mistaken view s 
on their character.  
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Nor is knowledge and understanding of normative phenomena unconnected to our knowledge 
and understanding of other phenomena. We have a fair grasp of the way normative phenomena 
depend on the existence of certain physical, psychological, social and economic conditions, even 
though there is much more that remains to be discovered about these dependencies. 
Normative explanations of the conditions for the application of normative properties typically 
rely on a mix of normative and non-normative phenomena. And the normative properties of 
how things are in the world have a considerable impact on the way matters develop in the 
world, even if this impact depends on people realizing how things are normatively speaking.21  
Throughout this paper I have been relying on the assumption that there may well be distinct 
types of explanation and argumentation in different domains.  
There is much that, so far as I can see, we do not understand. We do not know how far the 
explanatory methods we rely upon in various sciences and other domains can reach. We know 
that they have changed and were transformed during history, and expect that they will further 
develop in the future. But we do not know how far they can extend, and therefore we do not 
know whether their future development will lead towards greater integration of the different 
types of explanations known to us today, or towards their absorption in more comprehensive 
methods of explanation. That means that we are ignorant of the reasons for the existence of 
different types of explanation, and their inter-relations. As a result we are also in the dark as to 
the possibility and nature of conflicts between types of explanations. Various scientists are quick 
to declare that they have explained what was unexplained before about human conduct and 
more, and that their explanations replace the common, non-scientific explanations we rely on. 
Often enough such claims are exaggerated, and while the new scientific knowledge is valuable, 
it does not conflict nor make redundant the types of explanations we had relied on before. There 
is much still to discover about these matters, and until we do, many of our views, including those 






                                             
21  And, to repeat: the impact of the way things are normatively is not the impact of how 
people are brought up, socialized, etc. Needless to say, people can understand normative 
principles, just as they can understand physics, only if they are brought up and socialized 
in certain ways. But as most values are cultural products, this increases the reliability of 
people’s views of normative matters, rather than undermining it.  
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